The Stock Exchange and United Outages Weren’t Hacks But They Were Just As Scary – By Lily Hay Newman JULY 9 2015 7:50 PM

 A trader on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange during Wednesday's outage. Photo by Lucas Jackson

A trader on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange during Wednesday’s outage.
Photo by Lucas Jackson

On Wednesday, an hour-and-a-half-long reservation system failure grounded United Airlines flights, the New York Stock Exchange was down for almost four hours, and the Wall Street Journal’s website suffered intermittent outages. At an intelligence committee hearing that afternoon, Sen. Barbara Mikulski firmly told FBI Director James Comey, “I don’t believe in coincidences.” But no matter how hack-like the situation seemed, all three companies and law enforcement have been adamant that bad actors were not behind the failures. And that’s just as scary.

A United representative told the Los Angeles Times that a router issue had “degraded network connectivity for various applications,” causing the company’s system problems. And after consistently but opaquely claiming that there weren’t bad actors behind the stock exchange outage, NYSE said in a statement on Thursday that a software update was to blame. “As is standard NYSE practice, the initial release was deployed on one trading unit … [but] there were communication issues between customer gateways and the trading unit with the new release.” NYSE attempted to correct the problem, but this caused new complications and “the decision was made to suspend trading.” The Wall Street Journal is still investigating the cause of its outages, with some speculating that heavy Web traffic brought the site down.

Between the Office of Personnel Management hack and the breach at Sony, the idea of large-scale malicious cyberattacks has become markedly more real for consumers in recent months. But Dave Chronister, who founded the cybersecurity firm Parameter Security and formerly did IT management at financial institutions like A.G. Edwards, points out that there doesn’t have to be a bad actor on the other end for something to be a cybersecurity problem. “We’re in a hypersensitive time right now where everybody’s worried about the malicious attacker, but the chances are you’re going to have a lot more incidents like [those on Wednesday] than actual attacks,” he said. “These were security incidents. The systems went down. It didn’t matter that it wasn’t an attack.”

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We Need Our Police to Be Better Than This – Nick Gillespie 12.31.14

Yes, cops are under stress. But they’re trained to rise above emotional responses. It’s part of having the badge and the right to use force.

Lucas Jackson/ Reuters

In 1951, Harry Truman fired Gen. Douglass MacArthur during the Korean War. The two never got along, but that wasn’t why Truman canned him. “I didn’t fire him because he was a dumb son of a bitch, although he was,” explained Truman after the fact. “I fired him because he wouldn’t respect the authority of the President.” You expect soldiers of all ranks to understand the need to respect the chain of command, regardless of personal feelings.

Soldiers—and cops, too.

Which is one big reason the display by members of the New York Police Department at the funeral of slain patrolman Rafael Ramos is particularly disturbing. At Ramos’ funeral service on Saturday, NYPD rank-and-file—along with members of police forces attending from around the country—turned their backs when Mayor Bill de Blasio delivered his eulogy. This was a very public fuck you to a politician widely perceived by conservatives and law-and-order types as weak on crime and in the pocket of social justice warriors. Yet the cops’ protest illustrates exactly what drives so much fear of the police: the worry that cops react emotionally and impulsively in situations that call for cool rationality and a reliance on training and strategic restraint. “It wasn’t planned,” said one of the protesters. “Everyone just started doing it.”

“I certainly don’t support that action,” said NYPD Commissioner Bill Bratton. “I think it was very inappropriate at that event.” Bratton—whom de Blasio appointed and who first served as commissioner under tough-guy Rudy Giuliani—is very much in the tradition of “Give ‘em Hell” Harry Truman. Which is to say that he at times lets his emotions get the best of him, as when he spuriously implicated President Obama for strained relations between police and citizens, saying that cops feel as if they “are under attack from the federal government at the highest levels.”

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Withdrawal Symptoms – By Rick Brennan FROM OUR NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 ISSUE

The Bungling of the Iraq Exit

This way out: leaving Iraq, December 2011. (Lucas Jackson / Reuters)

In a speech at Fort Bragg on December 14, 2011, President Barack Obama declared that the U.S. military would soon depart Iraq, ending one of the longest wars in American history. The United States, Obama said, would leave behind “a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq, with a representative government that was elected by its people.” Four days later, the last U.S. military unit crossed from Iraq into Kuwait, and American armed forces transferred all their responsibilities to either the central government of Iraq, U.S. Central Command, or the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, completing the most complex handoff from military to civilian authorities in U.S. history.

The next day, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki — who since 2006 had sought to enhance his personal interests and those of Shiite religious parties at the expense of Iraq’s Kurds and Sunni Arabs — secured an arrest warrant for Iraq’s Sunni vice president, Tariq al-Hashimi, accusing him of supporting terrorism. A crisis erupted when Hashimi’s Sunni-dominated political bloc boycotted the national unity government that Obama had so recently touted as inclusive and responsive to the Iraqi people.

That same week, 17 explosions rocked Baghdad, killing at least 65 people and wounding more than 200; al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) later claimed responsibility. With Iranian encouragement, Maliki’s government began to systematically target Sunni elites on the basis of trumped-up charges of terrorism or alleged affiliation with the outlawed Baath Party. Sectarian violence soon erupted, and by May 2013, it had reached levels not seen since the waning days of the civil war that engulfed Iraq in the wake of the 2003 U.S. invasion.

Meanwhile, Maliki firmed up his grip on the Iraqi intelligence and security forces, replacing competent Sunni and Kurdish officers whom he mistrusted with Shiites personally loyal to him. He refused to appoint permanent ministers for defense, the interior, and Iraq’s National Security Council, instead controlling those ministries himself through an extraconstitutional organization called the Office of the Commander in Chief. In April 2012, the Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani warned that Iraq was moving back toward dictatorship — the one thing, he said, that might lead him to seek Kurdish independence.

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